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SALES OF GOODS AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Since 1915 Pennsylvania had had its Sales Act. The
4th Section introduced a new defense in suits on sale contracts. It has proven a popular defense and it may be useful to review the decisions and note the construction placed
upon this section by the courts.
The section is as follows:
"Section 4. First. A contract to sell or a sale of any
goods or choses in action of the value of five hundred dollars or upwards shall not be enforceable by action unless the
buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so
contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same,
or give something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part
payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing of
the contract or sale be signed by the party to be charged or
his agent in that behalf.
Second. The provisions of this section apply to every
such contract or sale, notwithstanding that the goods may be
intended to be delivered at some future time, or may not at
the time of such contract, or sale be actually made, procured,
or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or some act may
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be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or rendering the same fit for delivery; but if the goods are to be
manufactured by the seller especially for the buyer and are
not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the
seller's business, the provisions of this section shall not apply.
Third. There is an acceptance of goods within the
meaning of this section when the buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods, or any part thereof, expresses by
words, or conduct his assent to becoming the owner of those
specific goods."
"SHALL NOT BE ENFORCEABLE BY ACTION"
Manufactures Light & Heat Company v. Lamp, 269
Pa. 517, decided that parol evidence could not be used to
show the term during which a contract for the sale of natural gas was to be effective, though the defendant had
signed a writing fixing the price.' The statute is declared
to be a limitation upon the judicial authority to afford remedies. It does more than provide a mere rule of evidence.
This construction logically led to the decisions in Mason-Heflin Coal Company v. Currie, 270 Pa. 221, and Briggs v.
Logan, I. & S. Co., 276 Pa. 326, that a plaintiff must Set
forth in his statement of claim enough facts to show that
the statutory requirements have 'been complied with, though
he is not required to aver facts relied on to take his case
out of the statute of limitations. Apologies are made for
prolonging the latter rule. The former works for defeat at
the outset. The latter but illustrates the "Law's delays."
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The decision in the last named case was interpreted by
the District Court of the United States in a suit brought in
Delaware on a Pennsylvania contract to amount to a decision that the section relates to the validity of the contract
rather than to the remedy and hence that the contract was
invalid everywhere though there was no such statute where
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suit was brought.
Franklin Sugar Refining Company v.
Holstein Harvey's Sons, Inc., 275 Fed. 622.
CONTENTS OF THE WRITING
In the Manufacturers Light & Heat Company case the
court declared that all of the essentials of the agreement
must appear in the writing, as had long been settled in
cases involving real estate. "Separate writings must bear
internal reference one to the other." In C. Noel Leigh
Co. v. Stitzinger & Company, 281 Federal 1015, this case
is cited and the rule is given as follows: "To satisfy the
statute the memorandum must contain within itself or by
some reference to other written evidence the names of the
vendor and the vendee, and all of the essential terms and
conditions of the contract, expressed with such reasonable
certainty as may be understood from the memorandum and
other written evidence referred to, if any, without any aid
from parol testimony." The doctrine was applied again in
Northwestern Consol. Milling Company v. Rosenberg, 287
Fed. 785, by the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming the District Court's decisions reported in 275 Fed. 878 and 277
Fed. 245. The buyer had signed an application for a shipping permit but not the sale memo. Oral evidence was inadmissible to connect the papers. It is the memo. of the
agreement that must be signed and the internal reference to
the other writing must appear in the one that is signed.
Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Howell, 274 Pa. 190, reiterates the doctrine, reversing Judge Finletter's able opinion
reported in 30 D. R. 1079. To fix the price of sugar the
seller could deliver under the contract, reference had to be
made to a trade list showing the differential between granulated and other sugars, since the sale memo. only fixed the
price of the former as a basis from which all other prices
were to be figured. There being no internal reference to
this list in the sale memo. it was excluded. Whether this
list was admissible to explain a trade usage or custom was
not before the court in the Howell case. It has since been
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disposed of. This case is followed in Lippincott v. Stringer, 80 Super Ct. 162.
Ideal Manufacturing Company v. Aronson & Treegoob, 29 D. & C. 471, held that a letter from the defendant to the plaintiff which did not identify within its four
corners the invoice exhibited as representing the contract
sued on is not a sufficient memo. and the invoice cannot
be used to supplement the latter.
Ottenberg v. Bailey Cigar Co., 1 D. & C. 768, decides
that a memo. is insufficient which does not contain the
name of the person to whom the order is given. Letters
accepting the order may not be used since they were not
referred to in the writing signed by defendant.
Southern Pine Sales Corporation v. Braddock Lumber
Co., 69 Pittsb. L. J. 240, holds that a letter of defendant
which identifies an order by the number of the slip and
which acknowledges the making of it and requests cancellation is a sufficient memo., but Michigan Star Furniture
Co. v. Tiddy, 3 D. & C. 621, limits this doctrine to cases
in which defendant's letters clearly identify the order referred to.
TRADE USAGES
In Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Colvin Atwell & Co., 286
Fed. 685, plaintiff undertook to translate in his statement
the words "basis 22.50," and he set forth therein the list of
differentials. The court declared that there was "but oie
standard trade differential in each grade or package," and
accordingly held that the differentials might be shown by
parol evidence. "I have no difficulty," said the court, "in
reaching the conclusion that under the pleadings, the writings in question satisfy the statute. The cases of Franklin
Sugar Ref. Co. v. Sprunks, 23 Lack. Jur. 313 and of
Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Ellsworth, 22 Luz. Leg.* Reg.
207 and other Pennsylvania cases, are in harmony with this
conclusion."
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But in Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Kane M. & G. Co.,
278 Pa. 105, a demurrer to a like statement was sustained.
A trade usage or custom may be used to show the meaning,
in the trade, of words actually used in the contract, but the
memorandum must contain all the necessary terms of an express contract or by proper reference include as part thereof a separate writing. It appeared that the trade differential changed from time to time and the signed memo. made
no reference to any writing which showed what the differential was at the time the memo. was signed. It was changed
at will by the sugar companies as their desires for profit
dictated. To call this a custom was ridiculed by the court.
The victory of Owen J. Roberts over his eminent adversary
Senator George Wharton Pepper, in this long drawn out battle over these sugar contracts, involving, as they did, hundreds of defendants who had cancelled orders after the bottom dropped out of the sugar market, with losses of many
millions to be placed on the buyers or the sellers as the issue might be decided, has attracted wide attention. We
wonder whether it did not help the Senator to his decisiohl
to recommend Mr. Roberts to the President to prosecute
the oil cases, now absorbing the attention of the nation.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The section has been attacked as unconstitutional on
two grounds. First, as special legislation, since it only applies if the goods are "of the value of five hundred dollars
or upwards." The Mason-Heflin Coal Co. case declared
that the reasonableness of the distinction was manifest and
the point at which the line should be drawn was held to be
a legislative and not a judicial question.
In Gano, Moore & Co., Inc. v. Burtons Coal Co., 28
D. R. '825, it was objected that the title of the act was defective as not disclosing that it contained a substantial reenactment in Pennsylvania of the Seventeenth Section of the
English Statute of Frauds. "In legislation of the character
before us," said the judge, "where it appears to be the ob-
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vious intention of the lawmaking body to codify, revise and
clarify the whole law of the state relating to the sale of
goods under a title clearly expressed in words which by
their very generality give warning that everything within
their limits may be affected in the body of the act, we do
not feel that we are required to apply critical or strained
construction; nor are we at liberty to set aside the legislative will except for imperious necessity imposed by the
Constitution. Such necessity does not appear in this case."
"SIGNED BY THE PARTY TO BE CHARGED"
The last mentioned case also adopts the settled rule that
the section only requires signature by the defendant in the
action, though a recovery by a plaintiff who has not signed
involves enforcing a contract which is not enforceable
against him. Mutuality has never been regarded as essential in cases arising under statutes using the expression
"party to be charged." Our statute relating to real estate,
in contrast to this, requires signature by the vendor in all
cases and by him alone, a distinction peculiar to Pennsylvania and one not always observed even by our appellate
court judges.
"OR HIS AGENT IN THAT BEHALF"
Dodd v. Stewart, 276 Pa. 225, holds that the agent
employed by the sellers to make the sale cannot bind the
purchaser by executing a memo. on his behalf. This case
ruled the decision in Rasche v. Campbell, 276 Pa. 268, in
which the alleged memo. was a telegram sent by an employee of the sellers' agent to the sellers' advising them of
These cases were distinguished,
the buyer's acceptance.
however, in Hill v. Marcus and Holtzman, 81 Super. Ct.
314, holding that a broker not in the regular employ of either
party, who induces the buyers to buy and the sellers to
sell at a price suggested by him, finally telegraphing the
seller confirming the sale and ordering shipment, may be
treated as the buyer's agent to sign a memo. Payment of
the broker's commission by the seller, in accordance with
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the custom of the trade, will not prevent him from acting
as agent for both parties in executing the necessary memo.
The agent of a seller of goods need not have a written
authority, as must the agent of a vendor of real estate by
the terms of the Act of 1772, and the memo. need not
state the agent's authority. It may be shown by parol.
Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Ellsworth, 3 D. & C. 681.

MEMORANDUM EXECUTED AFTER REPUDIATION
In the last mentioned case the defendant had himself
telegraphed the plaintiff after the shipment had been refused but this was held to be of no. effect, citing Lippincott v.
Stringer, 80 Super. Ct. 162. In the latter case the order
was given verbally. The seller confirmed it in writing.
The buyer then cancelled it verbally and followed with a letter confirming his verbal cancellation. The court refers to
the fact that "the defendant had a different purpose in view
than the acknowledgment of. the contract," but places the
decision on the ground that no liability can arise by a recognition in writing of an agreement that has been ended by
a cancellation made while it is still in such form that one
has a right to cancel it.
AGENCY MUST APPEAR FROM THE MEMO.
In Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Kane M. & G. Co., 278
Pa. 105, it was claimed that the broker was the agent of
both parties in signing the memo. But the memo. said:
"Sold by J. H. Huston Co., Inc." This was held to exclude
proof that the broker signed for the buyer. "When brokers
deal on behalf of both seller and purchaser, and undertake
a joint mission, it must appear, in this class of cases, and
the memorandum must show they signed for the purchaser
or the contracts will not be binding."

ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT
The character of the necessary acceptance is that defined in paragraph 3 of Section 4 and must be distinguished
from that defined in Section 48 of 'the act as sufficient for
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other purposes under the act. Clegg v. Lees, Super. Ct.
(not yet reported).
Dolan Mercantile Co. v. Marcus, 276 Pa. 404, contains
a full discussion of the construction of the words "accept
part of the goods and actually receive the same." Delivery
to a carrier is not "actual" receipt by the buyer and, of
course, acceptance normally does not precede arrival, since
he only then has a chance to inspect them and he may reject them if they are not as ordered. Though the seller
loses his lien by consignment by straight bill of lading, if
the buyer is or becomes insolvent, the seller may stop the
goods in transit. "Any right outstanding in the vendor, the
assertion of which would be sufficient io cause title and possession to be re-established in him, would so operate on the
sale as to exclude it from the exemption, and must be condemned." The right of stoppage in transit was held to be
such a right.
In Wexenblatt v. Katman and Greenburg, 75 Super. Ct.
219, the buyer was the plaintiff and he averred his demands
for delivery and his willingness to accept and so sought to
meet the objection that the memo. exhibited was not signed by the seller. But the buyer cannot thus by waiver avoid
the requirement of acceptance and receipt in fact.
In Northwestern Consol. Milling Co. v. Rosenberg, 287
Fed. 785, the seller, at the buyer's request, had permitted
the goods to remain in a warehouse for a considerable time.
But it appeared that the buyer was to pay a draft for the
price before removing the goods. As in the Dolan case this
retention of control by the seller was held to be incompatible with the "actual receipt" required by the statute.
ARGUMENTATIVE MEMORANDA
That a written acknowledgment of a prior verbal order
will satisfy the statute, if made before cancellation, is not
denied. However, in Southern Pines Sales Corporation v.
Braddock Lumber Co., 81 Super. Ct. 309, the buyer wrote
complaining of delay in shipment and cancelling the order on
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the ground that shipment in ten days was the basis on which
the verbal order had been given. The buyer had referred
to the seller's written acknowledgment of the order. However, "the requirements of the statute are not complied with
by a writing which acknowledges that an oral contract was
entered into but disputes that its terms are correctly stated
by the other party." * * * "The plaintiff could not use so
much of defendant's letter as suited its purpose in order to
make the requisite note or memorandum in writing of the
contract, and reject a part which essentially modified or
negatived the contract sued on. It was to avoid just such
disputes as to the contract entered into between the parties,
and the consequent temptation to falsify testimony concerning it, that the provisions of the Statute of Frauds and of
our Sales Act, invoked here by the defendant, were enacted."
Where a verbal order is given to plaintiff's agent, and
the principal sends a written confirmation containing new
conditions, and the defendant writes "please cancel" across
its face and his signature, this is not 4 sufficient memo.,
especially where it appears that the agent had no authority
to enter into a binding contract. Consolidated Mining Co.
v.,.Allebach, Super. Ct. (not yet reported).
MODIFYING AGREEMENTS
Producers Coke Company v. Hoover, 268 Pa. 104, decides that a contract may be modified by a subsequent parol
agreement, if the latter has been so far performed that the
statute would have been satisfied had it been an original
agreement. It is recognized that the rule in sales of real
estate requires not only that the original contract be in writing but that any new contract modifying it must also be in
writing, and the same rule applies in sales of goods if the
parol modification is not validated by part performance sufficient to satisfy the statute.
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PLEADING THE STATUTE
Franklin Sugar R. Co. v. Lykens M. :Co., 274 Pa. 206,
decides that if it is intended to deny the enforceability of a
contract sued on, because of the fourth section of the Sales
Act this should be averred in the affidavit of defense, either
by a reference to the section itself, or by such a statement
as makes certain that the defense is founded upon it. "Non
constat but that, the statement would have been adequately
amended if the point had been squarely presented; indeed
we cannot know from this record that defendant did not deliberately choose, if the other defenses made were unavailing, to be among those whose 'word is as good as his bond.'"
The court below had given judgment for the defendant on
an affidavit of defense in the nature of demurrer. Reversed.
In Josephson & Sons v. Weintraub, 78 Super. 14,
"the plaintiffs declared on a book account, which predicated
a delivery, not on a contract of sale. They stated nothing
as to any contract of sale, whether it was written or verbal.
The defendant denied delivery of the goods." The evidence
showed a verbal contract of sale. The affidavit of defense
had not referred to the Sales Act and it was contended by
the plaintiff that this precluded the defendant from relying
thereon. It was held that while a defendant is bound to
present every defense, upon which he relies, to the claim as
set forth in the plaintiff's statement, and he can introduce
no new defense to that claim so presented that is not set
forth in his affidavit, he is not bound to refer to every general act of assembly which the testimony, as it is unfolded,
may make applicable to the facts in evidence."
In American Products Co. v. Refining Co., 275 Pa.
332, plaintiff's statement averred an oral contract and the
affidavit of defense denied that any contract was ever entered into. A jury found for the plaintiff but the court sustained a motion for judgment n. o. v. because of section 4
of the Sales Act. Prior to the filing of the opinion so deciding, plaintiff offered to amend, averring a partial delivery
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and receipt and the judgment was reversed for the refusal
to permit this amendment. It was held that it was permissable to invoke the statute of frauds, though it was not invoked in the pleadings nor at the trial. It should have been
raised by statutory demurrer, but the denial of the making
of the contract made the statute an available defense. Failure to affirmatively plead the statute is not to be treated as
a waiver of it, as in case of the statute of limitations, since
the one contract is "unenforceable" from the beginning and
the other was enforceable until the statutory period had
elapsed. But if a defendant invokes the statute only after
trial, the plaintiff must be given a fair opportunity to meet
it by an amendment to his statement and proof at the new
trial of such additional facts as may take the case from the
ban of section 4.
f
JOSEPH P. McKEEHAN.
Note. Sinse the foregoing was written the report of
the decision in Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. John, 279 Pa. 104,
has appeared. While recognizing that a sufficient memo.
may be made out by means of a letter referring to an
earlier unsigned writing, decides that such earlier writing
must show all of the terms of the agreement and the letter
must acknowledge the obligation. The previous paper must
be clearly identified by the reference and the letter must
admit the making of the contract. A letter disclaiming
responsibility may do, but only so, if it clearly appear that
there was a closed agreement and that its terms are recognized and the alleged original is authenticated.
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MOOT COURT
HILLMAN, RECEIVER V. WILSON
Corporations-Subscription to Stock-Payment in Property-Burden
of Proof-Evidence-Equity.
STATEMENT

OF FACTS

Wilson subscribed for ten shares In a corporation to be formed. It was then incorporated, bit shortly thereafter, became insolvent and Hillman was appointed receiver. This is a bill to comWilson alleges payment by depel payment of a subscription.
livery of an engine, worth in the opinion of the witnesses $600. No
evidence that any one having authority, had agreed to accept the
engine in payment or that the engine was adapted to any corporate
use. The court has entered a decree for $500, with interest from
time when the subscription should have been paid.
Stepchincas, for Plaintiff.
Warrick, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Walker, J.

As early as Bell's Appeal in 115 Pa. 88, the rule

was laid down that the obligation on the part of a stockholder to
pay his stock is not statutory obligation; but an obligation in Equity
arising out of the consideration that the capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund for the payment of debts. As soon as the
company was incorporated, Wilson was liable for the amount of
stock that he subscribed. The above rule was followed in 139 Pa.
217; 144 Pa. 45; 198 Pa. 75, and 212 Pa. 180.
Wilson endeavors to show payment on his subscriptiorn by de
livery of an engine. This delivery was not authorized by any one
having authority to bind the corporation, nor was the engine used
for corporate uses. If the contract to exchange the engine for
stock was made by a promotor to induce Wilson to subscribe, the
In Bell's Gap R. R. Co.
contract is not binding on the corporation.
vs Christy 79 Pa. 54 the rule was established that a corporation is
not liable upon a contract made by its promotor before its organization, though made in its name, unless it has expressly or impliedly
adopted

the same

since its organization

or unless liability is im-

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

189

posed upon it by its charter or by some statue. This was reaffirmed In 254 Pa. 152 and in 276 Pa. 496.
The corporation did not authorize the payment of the subscription by the engine; neither did it appropriate it to corporate uses.
It is not liable under an implied contract. The payment for the
stock in property was never the subject of contract or agreement
between the defendant and the corporation.
The finding of the court below in entering a decree for the
price of the subscriptions, with interesti from the time it should
have been paid is AFFIRMED.
OPINION

OF SUPREME COURT

Payment of a stock-subscription may be enforced by the receiver of an insolvent corporation by a bill in equity. Bole v. Murray,
233 Pa. 589.
The court below has properly held that the subscription has
not been paid.
The delivery of the engine was not payment, because no agent of the corporation is shown to have agreed to accept it as payment.
It is not necessary to decide that a subscription prior to incorporation could be paid in something other than
money.
The value of the engine could not be set off against the subscription for it does not appear that it was adapted to any corporate use, or had been received by any authorized agent of the corporation.
The appeal Is therefore DISMISSED.

O'DONNELL VS RAILROAD
Vorkmen's

Compensation-Railroads--Iaster

-Interstate

and

Commerce-Presumption'-Burden

Servunt-Death
of Proof-Evid-

ence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant carried on both inter and intra-state commerce.
O'Donnell a flagman was mortally injuried while flagging a train.
It does not appear whether this train was engaged in inter or intrastate operation. The widow had obtained compensation from the
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Board. The Federal Act of
1908 makes provision for compensation in inter-state traffic cases.
On appeal from the state board's decision the railroad company alleges that; (a) if the Federal law is applicable the state law is not; (b)
since the railroad was engaged in both sorts of commerce. the one
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who alleges the applicability of the state law must show that the Injury arose in the doing of intra-state commerce.
Goodman, for Plaintiff.
Scott, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Perlstein, J. The question to be determined is; Which courts
have jurisdiction over the case? This question of jurisdiction hinges
on whether the defendant was engaged in inter-state or intra-state
commerce.
If the former, the Federal law applies, and the state
law has no effect; if the latter, the Pennsylvania act applies, and
the case is properly brought in our Pennsylvania courts.
We must properly determine the character of commerce the defendant Is engaged in.
The nature of the emplyment of a railroad
emplyee Is by the work In hand at the immediate time of the accident, and as such, work often shifts rapidly from one class of employment to the other; each case must be determined in the light of Its
particular facts, and governed by the purpose of the operation. If
the work In hand Is Inter-state, or so closely related thereto, as to
be practically a part of it, then It falls within the act of Congress,
otherwise It Is within State act.
In Philadelphia & Reading R. R. Company vs Di Donato 256
U. S. 327. which came up to the Supreme court of the United
States from our own courts, (having been decided in 226 Pa. 412),
the facts were somewhat similar to those of the case at bar. A
flagman employed by a railroad company, which .engaged In both
Inter-state and intra-state commerce, was fatally injured by a' train
which he was flagging. The widow of the deceased was awarded
compensation by the Workmen's Compensation Board, after an Investigation by a referee. This award was affirmed. In the Common
Pleas Court and Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, both of which
held, "that there Is no presumption that the train was an Interstate train. It is not a matter governed by presumption, but by
proof, the burden of which rests upon the railroad company alleging It. If no evidence Is offered upon the question, the defence
fails."
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of the U. S., and
alleged that It is considered as being engaged In Inter-state commerce, and that the Workmen's Compensation Act of Pennsylvania
.did not apply.
The Supreme Court held that the deceased was employed in
Inter-state commerce at the time, and cited as its authority Its earlier decisions In Pederson vs Deleware R. R. 229 U. S. 146, "that
where humans were Instruments of Inter-state as well as Intra-state
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commerce, they were to be considered as employed in inter-state
commerce." Numerous other cases so hold.
Having decided that the deceased was engaged in inter-state commerce, the court held that no presumption could arise as to burden
of proof resting on the plaintiff, and that neither the Pennsylvania
courts nor the Workmen's Compensation Board had jurisdiction.
This case was upheld in Philadelphia & Reading I R. Company vs
Polk 256 U. S. 332. and in Scanlon vs Payne 271 Pa. 391.
The old rule in Pennsylvania having been set aside by the opinion of the Supreme Court of the U. S., we feel constrained to follow this more recent trend in the decisions and hold that it is upon
the party who alleges that the defendant was engaged in intrastate commerce to prove his allegations. If such proof fails, then
the state law cannot apply.
It does not appear in which kind of commerce the defendant
was engaged, and it is not within our province to presume it is
intra-state. On the contrary, the leaning is entirely toward the presumption of inter-state commerce. But we do not here attempt to
decide this question, no testimony having been offered which might
clear this point.
In conformity with the views of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and in view of the acceptance of the doctrine by our own
States Supreme Court, the judgement of the Workmen's Compensation Board is reversed, and the record remitted to the Workmen's
Compensation Board for the purpose of definitely finding the nature
of the deceased's employment, that the question of jurisdiction be
finally determined.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The well written opinion of the learned court below makes discussion of the case by us unnecessary.'
AFFIRMED.

CURTISS V. HENRY
Real Property-Rule against Perpetuilte's-Option's--ConstrustlonIntlution-Cloud on Title--Equity.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Curtiss conveyed
time Henry made a
at any time within
paying the price plus

to Henry and his heirs a house. At the same
convenant with Curtiss to reconvey the house
twenty five years on Curtiss' demand, he reany addition for any improvements made. Fif-
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teen years elapsed and Curtiss demanded a reconveyance. The
court below dismissed the bill on th ground that the convenant for
reconveyance was void.
Abrahams, for Plaintiff.
Baratta, for Defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
Barna, 0. This is a bill in equity for the specific performance
of a convenant to reconvey a house, which was executed at the
same time that the deed was. The lower court held that the convenant for reconveyance was void and In order to decide whether
the lower court was right we must first decide what Is the nature
of the transaction and what force Is to be given to the convenant.
The counsel for the plaintiff contends that it is a mortgage and
that the convenant was a defeasance. This contention the court
refuses to affirm although some cases seem to hold to the contrary. It has repeatedly been held by early Pennsylvania cases
that a deed and an agreement to reconvey constitute a mortgage
and that such presumption Is conclusive. But on examining the
cases cited for this proposition it will be seen that in every case
there was either a debt or obligation existing between the parties. It is well settled that in order to convert a conveyance of land
into a mortgage there must be some debt due or obligation existing
between the parties. In the case at bar there is no such debt or
obligation.
Justice Paxton, in Emory v. Marshal, 42 Legal Intelligencer 935
unequivocally states that a court of equity may decree a deed absolute on Its face to be a mortgage, but equity cannot declare an
absolute conveyance to be a mortgage unless it appears that the
relation of debtor and creditor existed between the parties; without this there can be no mortgage.
In deciding whether a conveyance Is a mortgage or not one
must consider the effect of other clauses in the transaction, the intention of the parties, and the obligation to repay the purchase
money.
Hooncker vs Merkey 102 Pa. 462.
Helfenstein's Estate 135 Pa. 293.
Haines vs Thomson 70 Pa. 434.
The cases cited by the attorney for the plaintiff are different
from the case at bar as there Is a clear Intention to create a mortgage. In Colwell vs Woods, 3 Watts 188, there was an agreement
by the vendor to pay Interest on the money paid for the purchase
of the property, the vendor remained In possession of the premises
after the conveyance and the court held that conveyance was a
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security for a loan. In Harper's Appeal 64 Pa. 315, the facts also
disclosed that the actual intent was to create a mortgage.
Since there is no relation of debtor and creditor or obligor and
obligee, nothing from which we can presume an intention that
there should be a mortgage, and the fact that Curtiss was not bound
to return the money within a definite time, we are of the opinion
that there Is no mortgage In this case.
The convenant to reconvey was an option. An option Is a unilateral agreement binding upon the optionor from the date of its execution, but does not become a contract inter partes in the sense
of an absolute contract to convey on one side and to purchase on the
other until exercised by the optionee.
Barnes vs Rea, 219 Pa. 279.
Being an option it Is void as the rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of contingent Interest in real or personal property, either legal or equitable, which must vest within a life or
lives In being and twenty one years thereafter.
Tiffany on Real Property, page 344.
Curtiss did not mention any life or lives in being merely adopted
the twenty five year term therefore the term cannot extend over
twenty one years.
Johnson's Estate. 185 Pa. 179.
Perry on Trusts, page 349.
Williams on Real Property, page 317.
The estate of Curtiss Is a future one and not vpqt,,( as it de pends on his demanding a reconveyance. The event upon which
It was to arise is uncertain as he might demand reconveyance within
twenty five years or he might never demand it. A mere privilege of
exercising a future right to purchase cannot be deemed a present
vested interest in land.
Barton vs Thaw. 246 Pa. 348.
The fact that Curtiss demanded reconveyance fifteen years later
Is immaterial as the convenant was void from the day of its making.
Every executory limitation is too remote, and is therefore void under
the rule, unless at the date when the instrument creating it goes
into effect, it Is apparent that the future estate thereby created,
must vest within the limits prescribed by the rule. The mere fact
that the estate may possibly vest within the period, or even in all
probability, do so. is not sufficient, in fact the slightest possibility
that the period preceeding the vesting of the estate will continue
beyond the limits prescribed by the rule Is sufficient to Invalidate
the limitation.
16 Pepper & Lewis Dig. of Decisions 27020.
Barton vs Thaw, 246 Pa. 348.
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Lilley's Estate, 272 Pa. 143.
Gerbers Estate, 196 Pa. 366.
The case of Barton v. Thaw, supra, is similar to the case at bar.
There was a conveyance of land in fee simple and a covenant was
made to reconvey the land at any time whenever the vendor demanded it to be reconveyed. It was held to be an option and such an
option was void under the rule against perpetuities.
As the covenant to reconvey was an option to purchase the
house within twenty five years and since such option was void, the
bill was properly dismissed and the judgment of the lower court is
affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
But little needs to be said by us in view of the clear opinion of
the trial court.
There can be no mortgage, without a debt or obligation, on the
part of the mortgagor, of which the mortgage Is intended to enforce the payment, or performance.
When Curtis conveyed the
house, there was no duty on his part to pay his grantee anything.
No debt existed.
The learned court below has properly regarded the transaction
as a conveyance of the house, and the assumption of a duty by the
grantee to reconvey It at any time in 25 years on certain conditions
If Curtis should demand such reconveyance. Curtis was under no
duty to demand It.
There was no absolute duty in Henry to reconvey.
If the agreement to reconvey Is valid, the estate of Henry
is contingently defeasible.
He cannot convey an absolute estate.
For 25 years it remains uncertain whether he shall have a fee or
not. By the act, within that time, of Curtis, the defeasible estate
may be in fact defeated, if the reservation of the right to a reconveyance was valid.
Suspension of a complete vesting, would have
been tolerated for 21 years, but, no longer. The contingency must
be such that It must pass to a certainty within that period.
Since
the period here named was 25 years, the provision for divesting the
estate of Henry by a demand for reconveyance is void ab Initto
Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, Is a sufficient authority, as the trial
court has found.

Its Judgment therefore is AFFIRMED.
HICKS v. ADDISON

Attachment execution-Proof
promissory note-Evidence.

of Debt

of Garmishee-Payment

by

STATEMENT OF FACTS
After obtaining a Judgment for $250 against Addison, he (Hicks)
learned that Hendricks had given Addison a negotiable note for
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$300. He has made Hendricks garnishee in execution attachment.
Hendricks and Addison testified that tfter the service of the attachment, Addison transferred the note to Pitney, who had no knowledge of the attachment for $275. The special verdict of the jury
found the transfer and the Ignorance of Pitney. Court nevertheless ordered judgment against Hendricks as garnishee.
Sporkin. for Plaintiff.
Sharp, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Le Viness, J.
The facts in this case call for the application of
an attachment execution., This question has received
statutory
regulation and we will turn our attention to such regulation and
determine its applicability to the case.
The Act of June 16, 1832, P. L. 767, also found In 2 Purdon's
Digest page 1532, section 35, provides: "In the case of a debt due to
the defendant or of a deposit of money made by him, or of goods or
chattels pawned, pledged or demised as aforesaid, the same may be
attached and levied in satisfaction of the judgment In the same
manner allowed in the case of a foreign attachment, but in such case,
a clause, In the nature of a scire facias against a garnishee In a
foreigil attachment, shall be inserted in such writ of attachment,
requiring such debtor, depository, ballee, pawnee or person holding
the demise aforesaid to appear at the next term of the court, or at
such other time as the court from which
such process may Issue
shall appoint, and show cause why such judgment shall not be
levied on the effects of the defendant In his hands."
The question which arises for our disposition Is whether or not
a judgment creditor can reach and apply on his judgment a promissory note held by the judgment debtor by means of attachment
execution against the maker, after a transfer of the paper to the
third person.
It Is well settled In this state that a negotiable note not due may
be attached In the hands of the maker, at the suit of a creditor of
payee or holder. And It is equally well settled that such attachment
Is worthless as against a holder to whom the note had been negotiated before Its maturity without actual notice of the attachment,
even though the attachmeht preceeded the endorsement.
Hill vs. Kroft 29 Pa. 186.
A case similar to the one at bar is that of Holliday vs Patter et
al, 80 Superior Court, 194.
It was there held by Judge Gawthrop:
"It is well settled In this state that a promissory note not due
Is liable to attachment execution under the Act of June 16, 1836., P.
L. 767, but the attachment Is unavailing against a bona fide holder
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endorsee for value before maturity without actual notice of the attachment, even though the attachment preceeded the endorsement. The
negotiable character of the note is not destroyed by the service
of an attachment upon the maker, at suit of a creditor of the payee,
and the rights of a bona fide holder for value, who takes title without actual notice must prevail against those of the attaching creditors-Cases there cited.
The judgment is reversed and the record is remitted to the court
below with directions to enter judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME

COURT

The debt in this case was a promissory note for $300 negotiable
in form. After its attachment, it was endorsed to Pitney for $275.
Pitney was a purchaser without notice of the attachment, and beFrom the paying of but $275 for a note of $300,
fore maturity.
no inference can be drawn that Pitney was aware of the attachment.
The learned court below has properly decided that the right of
an endorsee, in such circumstances, is superior to that of an atDay v. Zimmerman, 68 Pa. 72; Ball v. Phila.
taching creditor.
Binding, etc. Co., 10 Super. 38; Colonna v. Morrissey, 72 Superior
200.
The judgment is AFFIRMED.

i
Wills.-Failure

in

HOOVER'S ESTATE

working

instrument-Residuary

bequests-Depen-

dent relative-Revocaton--4onstruction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hoover left a will In which he deviied certain property toX.
Learning this property was more valuable than he had supposed
he made a codicil in which he revoked the gift toX, and gave it to a
home for aged men. He did not have this codicil witnessed by two
X insists that since the gift intended to take
subscribing witness.
the place of the gift to him has failed, the gift to him continues
to have effect.
Detwiler, for Plaintiff.
Devers, for Defendant.

DICKTNSON LAW REVIEW
OPINION OF THE COURT
Einhorn, J. The first question for our consideration is whether
or not the dispository clause of the codicil is valid. Sec. 6 of the
Wills Act of 1917 provides in substance that no property can be devised or bequeathed to religious or charitable organizations, except
the same be done by will and attested by two credible and disinterested witnesses at least thirty days before the decease of the testator.
Construing Act of 26 April, 1855, which is practically identical in
terms with Sec 6 of the Wills Act, except that the period of one
calendar month has been changed to thirty days, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held in Arnold's Estate, 249 Pa. 348 that "the provisions relating to attestation and execution of wills containing bequests for chartiable uses are mandatory, and the failure to comply
with the provisions of the Act renders a disposition to charitable
uses void." In this case there were no attesting witnesses and in
the light of this settled law, we hold the dispository clause to be
void.
The second question before us concerns the revoking clause of
the codicil. The facts clearly show that the revocation was express
and absolute, and that it was induced by the rise in value of the
property. This therefore disposes of the contention that the revocation was only of effect because of the later inconsistent will to the
Home. Melville's Estate 245 Pa. 318.
Although the dispository clause is void, it does not necessarily
follow that the revoking clause is void. Sec. 20 of the Wills Act
together with Section .4 state in substance that no will shall be repealed except by a nuncupative will, committed to writing in the
lifetime of the testator, signed by him and proved to be so done by
two or more witnesses. No attesting witnesses are required. Since
it appears that the validity of the codicil has not been attached
on any of these grounds, we therefore find that the requirements of
the above Sections can be presumed to have been carried out; and
the revoking clause has been made with all the necessary formality.
In

12 Dickinson Law Review 187 (1907) in an article by Dr. Wil-

liam Trickett, the law is stated to be: "While a second will or
codicil which is not executed as the law requires for wills, generally,
cannot even revoke an earlier will; if complying with the general
law of wills, it is vulnerable merely because of giving property for
charitable or religious uses, it will revoke the earlier will though
its provisions for charities cannot be carried out "In support of this
rule Is cited:
Price vs. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23.
Hoffner's Estate, 161 Pa. 331.
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Appeal of Lutheran Cong. 113 Pa. 32.
Teacles Estate, 153 Pa. 219.
Looking through and examining this line of cases, we find that

the testator in each Instance died within thirty days of the making
of the codicil, the defect thus being one of an extrinsic nature. The
question then arises, is this rule applicable in the case at bar where
the defect in the codicil is intrinsic? We think it does, for were
we to hold otherwise, the testator's intention would thereby be defeated by the strict construction of the rule.
When the revocation is merely by implication, the authorities
recognize a clear distinction between failure of the dispositive part
of the revoking instrument because of a defect in the Instrument
and failure because of extrinsic circumstances; in the former case
revocation is inoperative, while In the latter it prevails. However,
If the later will contains an express clause of revocation, as in
this case, the earlier will is thereby rendered invalid irrespective
of the disposition of the property in the second will. This is the rule
laid down in Page on Wills. 271, which was later affirmed in Melville's Estate 245 Pa. 318, and which we now feel constrained to
follow.
The sum and substance of the plaintiff's whole argument
amounts to the doctrine of dependent relative revocation; that is,
the revocation is conditional and dependent on the efficacy of the
admitted new disposition, and that failing, the revocation also
fails. This rule, however, is not in force when the revocation is
express and absolute and it was so held in Ielville's Est. 245 Pa. 318.
The authorities, to which others of like effect may be added,
compel a conclusion adverse to the plaintiff's contentions and judgOPINION OF SUPREME

COURT

The bequest to X, was revoked by the codicil.
What the reason
of the revocation was, Is not disclosed by the testator. In the revoking codicil, there is a gift of the same property to a charity.
This gift is Invalid because of the want of a proper attestation.
Does the inability of the substituted gift to take effect, involve the
re-establishment of the bequest to X? What we need to know, is
the purpose of the testator.
He has expressed the purpose that
the formerly contemplated gift to X, should not have effect.
He
has not stated that tsis purpose is conditioned on the accomplishment of the alternative gift to the charity.
The will clearly expresses the intention to revoke.
It does not clearly or otherwise
express that this intention is conditional.
Why shall we Invent a
condition for him? He may have Intended the condition.
He may
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not have intended it.
It is hazardous to dispose of his estate on
the mere possibility that he did not distinctly express his will, in
omitting to say that his recall of the gift to X was only in order
that the gift to the charity might take effect.
The absence of attestation does not vitiate the whole of the
codicil.
It is only the charitable disposition in it. that is void.
The purpose to revoke X's gift remains effectively expressed.
The Act of 191.7 (Wills Act) directs that "all dispositions .of
property contrary hereto, shall be void and go to the residuary, legatees or devisee, heirs or next of kin according to law."
Of a
similar clause in the Act of 1856, Lewis. C. J., remarked, Price v.
Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23. 40.
"This clause excludes all idea of permitting the property to pass under any former will."
We cannot say that the testator would have preferred that X
should have the property, if, for any reason, the charity did not
get it.
Cf. Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318.
APPEAL DISMISSED.

HAMMOND V. SHARPLESS
Wills-Vested

and contingent

renaitnders--Construction-nt-ution.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Hammond devised his farm to his wife for her life
and "after her death to my son John, his heirs and assigns, but
should John die before his mother then over to his heirs." The
widow and John conveyed the farm to Sharpless. John died while
his mother was living, leaving his son James to survive. This action
is brought by James against Sharpless.
Reed, for Plaintiff.
Walker, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Mask, J. The question to be determined in this case is whether
or not John took a vested estate in the remainder under the will of
hi father, Win. Hammond.
The iearned counsel for defendant contends that when the will
became operative John Hammond had then a present absolute right
to the posession and enjoyment of the estate the instant the particular estate terminated. We concede that If he had such right, of
course the remainer due to him was vested but he has overlooked
the fact that the limitation over to John was to take effect only in
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case he was living at the death of the life tenant, a result not
derived from the rules of construction but from the language of
the will itself.
A life estate was given by the wiul of Win. to his widow. He
then created two alternative remainders, one to his son John in
case he should survive his mother, the other to the heirs of John,
should he die before his mother. These remainders were contiingent until the death of the widow. Then one of them became a
Nullity and the other a vested fee. Before the contingency was
resolved John and his mother conveyed their estate to defendant.
But, such conveyance could not change its quality nor could it
transmute it from contingent to vested.
Sharpless obtained only
what his grantors had, a vested life estate and a contingent fee.
Smith v. Piper 231 Pa. 378.
Raleighs Estate 206 Pa. 451.
The fee has since been extinguished by the death of John before his mother. A vested fee attached to James, who, therefore is
entitled to recover the possession from his fathers grantee.
The case of Frazier v. Scranton Gas and Water Co. 249 Pa. 570
is one similar to that before us foA consideration.
In that cause
the court said that when a life estate is given to A, with the remainder to B, but if B should die during A's life time then to B's
heirs, the estate in B is contingent because it can take effect only if
B is living at the death of A. The son took a contingent not a
vested remainder, and upon the son's death during the life time of
the life tenant (the mother) the remainder vested in his heirs. See
also 27 D. L. R. 166, let judgment be entered for the plaintiff.
Affirmed.

BLACK V.
Promissory

DELANCY

Notes--Evidence-Cross-examination-Non-suit.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A note for $400 which purported to be signed by Delancy, is
is sued upon. A witness was called by Black, who proves the execution of the note by Delancy. Delancy then cross-examines both
with respect to its execution and also the payment of the note. The
witness states that the note has been paid. Thereupon the court
enters a non-suit, the plaintiff having offered no other evidence.
The court has refused to take off the non-suit.
Auker, for Plaintiff.
Hallen. for Defendant.

DICKTNS6N LAW REVIEW
OPINION OF THE COURT
Malliday, J. From these facts two questions present themselves
before us.
First: Was there sufficient evidence to jusify giving the case
to the jury?
Second: Was the court justified In entering a non-suit because
of plaintiff's failure to prosecute the suit with due diligence or offer
sufficient evidence?
We find in Bellman v. Pittsburg and Allegheny Valley Railway
Co. 31 Superior Court 389, that the court held as follows:
"A peremptory non-suit is in the nature of a judgment for the
defendant on demurrer to the evidence and hence in testimony the
validity of such non-suit, the plaintiff is entitled to every benefit of
every inference of fact which might have been, fairly drawn, by the
jury from the evidence before them." Also from the same case we
learn that; "It is immaterial that the evidence in support of plainUiff's claim may be very slight, provided that it amounts to more
than a mere scintilla. If there is any evidence which alone would
justify an inference of the disputed facts on which his right to recover depends, it must according to a well settled rule be submitted to the jury.
The Act of March 11, 1875 reads: "When the defendant upon the
trial of a cause in any court of common pleas in this commonwealth, shall offer no evidence it shall be lawful for the judge presiding at the trial to order a judgment of non-suit to be entered, if in
his opinion the plaintiff shall have given no such evidence as in
law is sufficient to maintain the action, with leave nevertheless to
move the court in banc, to set aside such a judgment of a non-suit,
the plaintiff may remove the record by a writ of error into the
Supreme Court for revision and review in like mannel and like
effect as he might remove a judgment rendered against him upon a
demurrer to evidence.
As to whether the court was justified in entering a non-suit
because of plaintiff's failure to prosecute suit with due diligence or
offer sufficient evidence. We believe that plaintiff was negligent
in calling no more witnesses and also in failing to contradict his
own witness' admission of payment of the note.
It has been held in 169 N. Y. 129, "that failure to prosecute a
sult with due diligence, or failure to offer sufficient evidence are
grounds to grant motion for a non-suit.
The same rule was held in 240 Pa. 569 and 189 'Pa. 489.
In view of the foregoing, we discharge the rule to strike off
the non-suit and enter judgment for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT

The cross-examination of the witness pertained, not merely to
the execution of the note, about which his examination in chief had
concerned itself, but also to the payment of the note. Payment was
a matter about which it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to give
Non-payment is presumed, till proof of payment is tenevidence.
In alThe party to tender this proof is the defendant.
dered.
lowing the cross-examination as to payment, the rule which obtains
in Pennsylvania, which confines such examination to the themes of
the examination in chief, and to matters casting light on the credibility of witnesses was deDarted from.
It seems to have been the
The rise of this rule is curious.
unconscious invention in 1827, of C. J. Gibson, who in laying it
down departed, as if unaware that he was doing it, from old and
See a long and instructive discussion in 3
voluminous precedents.
As a rule of the order of putting in eviWigmore, Evidence 2488.
dence it seems to have little importance except for the circumIn 1869, Sharsstance that the trial court, thinks it important.
wood, J., while stating the rule, says "Yet I have not been able to
find a single case in which this (the Supreme Court) has reversed
on that ground" (i. e. that the trial court allowed a party to put
in his own case by cross-examination of the opposite party's witIn 1883, Trunkey, J., obJackson v. Litch, 62 Pa. 451.
nesses.).
served, "This court (the Supreme Court) has rarely, if ever, reversed for an error in permitting a violation of the rules relating
to cross-examination, which did not result to the prejudice of a
This
Hughes v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 104 Pa. 207.
party."
is quoted as expressing a fact, by Jusobservation of Trunkey, J.
tice Stewart, in 1911, in Catanzaro v. Pa. R. R. Co., 230 Pa. 305.
"never."
have said
For "rarely, if ever," these justices might
Would it not indeed, be puerile to set aside a judgment because the
trial court had allowed a violation of the prescribed order of putMere departting in evidence, which did not prejudice a party?
ure from the order can hurt no one but the pedant who believes in
the inviolability of forms.
The courts more freely allow the use of leading questions in
It is conceivable
cross-examination, than in examination in chief.
that an unduq advantage ought be obtained by the defendant, in elic.
iting from the plaintiffs witness, the facts that are useful to him
But appellate courts very rarely reverse for
by leading questions.
allowing leading questions. One instance is Thomas & Sons v. Loose
In the case before us, there is no alle& Co., 114 Pa. 35, 47.
gation that the question which elicited from the witness, the state-
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ment that the note sued on had been paid, was a leading one. There
can be no reversal, therefore, on that ground.
The fiction has obtained, that, when a party calls a witness, he
makes him "his own," and a further principle Is adopted that what
one's own witness says or fails to say, that Is harmful, unless counteracted by what other witnesses say, may be taken as true, by the
trial court, without Submitting it to a jury, and that, in the case of
a plaintiff, a compulsory non-suit can be founded upon It.
On the
other hand if this same witness, certified by thA plaintiff to be
trustworthy by tendering him, is called by the defendant, only what
he said In the examination by the plaintiff is to be deemed said under this certificate. What he says, when called by the defendant, is
to be deemed certified, not by the plaintiff who first used him,
but by the defendant.
But, if while on the stand at the call of the plaintiff, the defendant,
subjecting
him
to
cross-examination,
cross-examines
with regard to matters of defence, the court must consider the testimony thus educed as if it had been educed, after the witness had
left the stand, and later been recalled by the defendant, in the role
of his witness.
Said Trunkey, J., in Hughes v. Westmoreland Coal
Co., supra, (quoted In Catanzaro v. Pa. R. R. Co. supra). "Where
the defendant is improperly allowed to cross-examine the plaintiff's
witness and educe matter of defence, the jury should consider the
testimony so drawn out as if the witness had been called, and examined in chief on the part of the defendant."
So, as the jury
should not receive the evidence as if from the plaintiff's witness,
and so give it the weight of a formal admission by him, the court
should not treat it as a conclusive admission by the plaintiff, and
enter a non-suit, because of it.
The error of the trial court in this case, was in treating the
witness' statement that the note had been paid, as emanating from
the witness with the authority of the plaintiff; as being virtually an
admission or concession by the plaintiff, which the court could
treat as rendering a submission to the jury superfluous.
No reversible error occurred then till the entry of the non-suit
which was virtually on the testimony of the defendant's witness.
Catanzaro v. Pa. R. R. Co. supra; Hughes v. Westmoreland Coal
Co., supra; Hopkinson v. Leids, 78 Pa. 396.
The trial court should not have entered the non-suit, and, on
application, should have taken it off. Reversed.

204

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
HODGSON v. TATNALL

Trusts and Trustees-Trusts ex Maleficio-Fraud-Euity-Weight
of Testimony
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Hodgson, brother of John. devised his estate of $200,000 to his wife in fee. After his death, the widow, now remarried
and (Mr s . Tatnall) said to several persons that she induced the devise to her by promising Hodgson (the deceased) that she would
see that after her death the property would go to John, the testator's brother. She has since denied this and declared that she
could do with the (property) estate what she chose.
Lillienfeld, for Plaintiff.
Lerch, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Monheit, P. This is a bill in equity to have her declared a
trustee as to the remainder, after her death for John HodgSon.
The material issues involved In the case are:
1st. Are the defendants declarations admissible to prove a
trust?
2d. Is the testimony of several persons sufficient to overcome
the written intention of the testator?
3d. May oral testimony be introduced to establish a trust?
The law in regards to declarations against one's own interest
are admissible. This is one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule
and is so held in C. J., 22nd volume, page 232 (note). In 95 Pa.
203, and 26 Super. 203, It states that the parol evidence rule does
not preclude the reception of parol evidence witA reference to a
matter evidenced by a writing where such evidence Is of a character that does not tend to vary or contradict the written Instrument.
We are fully convinced from the facts stated, that the testimony of several witnesses is sufficient to overthrow the written
This is so held In 234 Pa. 261, where
intention of the testator.
the testimony of three persons was considered clear, concise and
indubitable and overthrew the written Intention of the testator.
The remaining questions to be determined by this court, is
whether a writing Is necessary to establish a trust. The doctrine
which is laid down by the court and in many previous cases is
that where a testator has been induced by the promise of the devisee to make a devise, that It should be applied to the benefit of
another, a trust Is thereby created, that may be established by pa-
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rol testimony and we find that this is not contrary to the Statute
of Wills nor within the Statute of Prauds and Perjurles. So held
In 234 Pa. 261.
It Is the element of fraud appearing in the case at bar% that
gives us the jurisdiction to inquire Into It. not with the view of enforcing a parol trust but to relieve against fraud by raising a constructive trust. The Act of 1856, does not apply to constructive
The
trusts and Is so held in 93 Pa. 462. (Stafford v. Wheeler).
fraud alleged here was that the defendant (Mrs. Tatnall) procured
the testator to devise the estate in fee to her, that upon her death
the property should go to John, the testator's brother. She has
since devised this and declared that she could do with the estate as
she chose.
In view of the above conclusion the prayer for a bill in equity,
that a trust relationship should be declared is granted.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
But little need be said by us, in support of the decision of the
learned court below.
If a testator devises to X, on the Inducement of X's promise
that Y shall obtain an estate In the thing devised, a trust affects
the devise, which may be enforced by a court of equity.
That the devise was so induced, may be proved by the oral
admissions of the devisee.
Authorities may be seen collected by Endlich, J., in Hollis v.
lIollis, 254 Pa. p. 94; Cf. Blich v. Cocklns, 234 Pa. 261.
The appeal Is DISMISSED.

